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ABSTRACT
Unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software is apparently commonplace. Recent
decisions by major software publishers to drop "copy protection" may well result in even more
unauthorized duplication. This paper addresses the impact of unauthorized software duplication
on software publishers' profits. Software "clubs" of the type suggested by Buchanan (1965)
are posited as providing a mechanism whereby software publishers can indirectly appropriate
revenue for unauthorized software copies. It is shown that, under certain conditions, software
publishers' profits may actually increase when users can make unauthorized copies.
Recent growth in microcomputer sales has brought Since unauthorized copying of software is perceived
with it growth in the demand for microcomputer as a problem, there are also articles listing avenues
software. Coincident with this growth has been an of legal "protection" available to software publishers
increased incidence of unauthorized duplication of (Price and Jones 1986) and articles discussing "copy
microcomputer software. Software publishers protection" mechanisms which can be incorporated
responded to unauthorized duplication of their into the original software product (Small 1985).
products with various forms of "copy protection."
Even with "copy protection devices," the claim has Microcomputer software is often thought of as a
been made that on the order of 50 percent of all creative work worthy of protection under copyright
microcomputer software currently in use is pirated laws. But surprisingly, there has been little specific
(DiNacci 1986, p. 126). In 1986, major software treatment of the economic issues concerning
publishers began removing "copy protection" from unauthorized copying of software or the impact of
their products. This paper examines the economic software copying on the market for software
effects of copying microcomputer software on products. Within the economics literature,
software publisher revenues. Currently such unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software
copying is unauthorized and illegal. The focus of falls within the purview of the considerable
this paper is on whether it might be in the best literature on optimal patents. Recent papers by
interest of the software publisher to authorize (at Novos and Waldman (1984) and Johnson (1985) expli-
least implicitly) such copying. Citly refer to unauthorized copying of software.
However, the assumptions employed by these authors
The popular press has treated unauthorized -- that unauthorized copies are equivalent to
duplication of microcomputer software as an evil originals, that the marginal costs of unauthorized
directly analogous to theft. Consequently, some copies vary across individuals, and that the marginal
articles admonish employers to prevent unauthorized cost of an unauthorized copy exceeds the marginal
copying by their employees (Cooper and Somervill cost of producing an original -- greatly limit their
1985) and others describe how unauthorized copying application to unauthorized duplication of micro-
injures the software publisher (Sacks 1985). It is computer software. In the case of unauthorized
claimed that unauthorized copying reduces the copies of software, the "quality" of the copy is
publisher's revenue and hence his incentive to often below that of the original, particularly if one
develop and bring to market new software products. includes documentation and publisher support of the
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product as part of an original software product. consumption of a copy. Let each individual's
Software which can be used to create unauthorized valuation of the product be ui. Further, let
copies is widely available. Thus the marginal cost individuals differ in their valuations of the product
of an unauthorized copy should not vary substan- by having ui distributed over the interval [O,U]
tially across individuals. Finally, the cost of an according to a density g(.) that is continuously
unauthorized copy may be as low as the cost of a differentiable and nonzero in the specified interval.
diskette, well below the producer's marginal cost If the software product sells for a price of P, an
which includes documentation and product support. individual's net benefit from the purchase of the
product would be ui - P. If obtaining an unautho-
This paper suggests that unauthorized copying of rized copy is impossible, those individuals with
software need not adversely impact publishers' positive net benefits from the purchase of the
revenues. Following Liebowitz (1985), a mechanism product will purchase the software product.
is suggested which allows a software publisher to
indirectly appropriate revenue from unauthorized Consider the publisher's pricing decision when
copies. Thus unauthorized duplication of software unauthorized copying is effectively prevented. The
may not reduce incentives to develop new software publisher's problem is to select tlie price, Pn. which
products. maximizes profits or
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. U
Section I presents a model of a software publisher's Max
pricing decision when copying is possible. Section A - p (P-m)g(x)dx - F. (2)
II discusses some implications of this model, P
including the possibility of publishers indirectly
appropriating revenue from unauthorized copies. A necessary condition for the maximization of
Section III illustrates the essential features of the equation (2) is
model with numerical examples. Section IV provides
some testable hypotheses based on the model. U
Finally, Section V contains concluding remarks and di r
suggestions for future research. - = j g(x)dx - (P-m)g(P) - 0. (3)
dp p
I. THE MODEL
This condition can be rearranged to yield the
The market for a particular software product is traditional "marginal cost equal to marginal revenue"
considered. The software publisher's product is condition,
assumed to be an imperfect substitute for other
software products. The effect of this assumption is U
that the software publisher faces a downward
sloping demand for his product. Equation (1) mg(P) - Pg(P) - g(x)dx (3a)
describes the publisher's total costs of producing x P
units of the product
where the first term on the right hand side is the
TC(x) -F+m x (1) additional revenue from sales to individuals with
valuation P and the second term is the revenue lost
where F denotes the fixed costs of developing the as a result of lowering the price to P. Further
software product and mx denotes the variable costs manipulation of equation (3) yields a profit maxi-
of production and sate of x units of the product. mizing price of
For a microcomputer software product, the cost of
an additional unit, m, would include the cost of
duplicating a diskette, printing the documentation, U
and providing some expected amount of support to
the purchaser. g(x)dx
pn
Individuals may derive utility from the consumption Pn=m+ (4)
of one unit of the software product or from the 3(Pn)
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where the price is equal to the variable cost plus a a) 0 < 6(n) < 1 for n > 1,
margin comprised of the ratio of total sales to b) 6(n) > 6(n+1),
marginal sales. c) c(n,P) s P,
d) there exists n' such that 6(n) - 6(n+1) >
Consider now the prospects of individuals obtaining c(n,P) - c(n+1,P) for all n > n:
unauthorized copies of the software product. How
is an original located for the purpose of making an Assumption a) states formally that the club's copies
unauthorized copy? What are the incentives for the are inferior to the original. Assumption b)
owner of an original to allow copying? A software indicates that the "quality" declines as club size
club in the sense of Buchanan (1965) is proposed to increases. The reasoning behind this assumption is
answer these questions. In such a club, a number that the "quality" reduction is related to the
of individuals come together to purchase one availability, quality, or access to documentation and
original and make copies for the remaining club publisher support. The larger the club, the further
members. For instance, a club could consist of each member is from the documentation and
three friends or business associates who arrange to publisher support.
have one purchase a word processor, one purchase a
spreadsheet, and one purchase a database manage- Assumption c) indicates that the cost to club
ment program and then share their programs. members of unauthorized copies does not exceed the
Alternatively, a "club" need not be so formal; purchase price of an original. If this assumption
owners of software could meet, discuss their were violated, joining a club would always be less
software holdings, and agree to swap. Participants desirable than purchasing an original and there
are willing to allow their software to be copied in would be no unauthorized copying.
exchange for receiving a copy of some other
software. Other examples of clubs could include The final assumption, assumption d), is critical. It
family members or workers in a particular depart- indicates that at some point the decline in the
ment or office - situations where one purchased "quality" of the copied software exceeds the cost
copy is used by more than one individual. savings from additional club members. This
condition will be met provided that quality deterior-
What is the value or utility of an unauthorized copy ates sufficiently fast while cost savings decrease at
to a club member? In this paper, it is argued that a decreasing rate. Those who have attempted to
the "Quality" of an unauthorized copy is less than read a photocopy of a software manual which
the "quality" of the original. Although the software heavily uses color would acknowledge that quality
code may be an exact duplicate of the original, the can decline rapidly. The behavior of costs as club
user of an unauthorized copy will not have access size increases can be predicted. Normally, one
to equivalent documentation or support from the would expect that the cost of an unauthorized copy
publisher. Often only the software code is copied, would decline with club size. Indeed, if copies can
leaving the unauthorized user with no documenta- be made at a cost of c and club members share
tion. Sometimes the manual is also copied. equally the purchase of the original, then c(n,P) = c
However, a photocopy of the manual may be + P/n declines in n where P is the cost of an
illegible in places, be missing pages, and is in a less original and n is the number of club members.
convenient package. Let the net benefit of However, software clubs are engaged in illegal
participating in a software club of size n be given activities. If the club's activities are detected and
by the club members prosecuted, the penalty could be
substantial. Thus c(n,P) should perhaps contain an
expected penalty term. Surely larger software clubs
6(n)ui - c(n,P). are more likely to be detected than small clubs.
Thus c(n,P) could increase with club size for larger
values of n. With quality deterioration and the
In the above expression, the 6(n) term captures the probable behavior of c(n,P) discussed here, assump-
reduced quality of unauthorized copies and c(n,P) is tion d) seems reasonable.
the effective cost of the unauthorized copies to
members of a club of size n. The following specific Within this context, an individual will purchase an
assumptions are made: original (join a club of size one) if
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ui -P>0 and (5a) The points at which individuals switch to a club of
size n, U(n), can be determined from conditions (5)
ui -P> 6(n)ui - c(n,P) for all n22. (5b) through (8). The valuation level at which in-
dividuals switch to clubs of size one (purchase
Condition (5a) indicates that the individual's net originals), U(1), follows from condition (5b) and is
benefit from the purchase of an original is positive. given by
Condition (5b) indicates that this same net benefit
exceeds the net benefit that would result from -
joining a club of any size. Max 1
U(1) - n [ P - c(n,P) ] (9)
An individual will join a software club of size n if 1-6(n)
the net benefit from doing so is positive and - -
exceeds the net benefit of either joining clubs of Individuals with valuations ui where
other sizes or purchasing the product. Formally, an
individual will join a club of size n if U(n) < ui < U(n-1) and ul > U(P)
6(n)ui- c(n,P) > 0, (6) will join clubs of size n. The switch point U(n)
derived from condition (8a) is given by
6(n)ui - c(n.P) > ui - P, (7)
c(n+1,P) - c(n,P)
6(n)uk - c(n,P) > 6(n+1)ui - c(n+1.P), and (8a) U(n) = (10)
6(n+1) - 6(n)
6(n)u - c(n,P) > 6(n-1)ui - c(n-1,P). (8b)
Finally, the lowest valuation level to yield a non-
Condition (6) indicates that the net benefit from negative net benefit, U(P), is obtained as
joining a club of size n is positive. Condition (7)
indicates that the net benefit from joining a club of Minsize n i s greater than the net benefit from U(P) -n{u i l 6(n)ui - c(n,P) -0 }(11)
purchasing an original. Finally, conditions (8a) and
(8b) indicate that the net benefit of belonging to a It can be shown that U(n) < U(n- 1).1
club of size n dominates the net benefit of
belonging to clubs of any other size. When copying occurs, the publisher does not sell
one unit of the product for each individual using
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between an the product. Rather, the publisher sells one
individual's valuation of the software product, ui, original to each club. Equations (9), (10), and (11)
and club membership. Net benefit schedules are can be used to define n(u,P), the size of club which
drawn for purchasers of originals (clubs of size an individual with valuation u would join if the
one), clubs of size two, and clubs of size three. software product were sold at a price of P. The
Individuals whose valuation of the product exceeds density, g(u), indicates the number of individuals
U(1) purchase the software since the net benefit with valuation leveI u. If those individuals are
from purchasing the software exceeds the net members of a software club of size n(u,P), then
benefit of all other alternatives. Individuals whose sales to individuals with evaluation level u would be
valuation of the product falls between U(2) and given by g(u)/n(u,P). In the presence of clubs, the
U(1) join clubs of size two since it is in this range publisher's market contains individuals with
that the net benefit of belonging to a club of size valuations as low as U(P).
two exceeds that of all alternatives. Similarly,
individuals whose valuations of the product falls The publisher's problem in an environment where
between U(P) and U(2) join clubs of size three. software copying clubs may exist is to select a
Finally, individuals whose valuations of the product price, P*, which maximizes the publisher's profits or
are below U(P) neither purchase nor copy the
product since neither activity would yield a positive U
net benefit. The relationship between product Max  g(x)
valuation and club size illustrated in Figure 1 X .. P (P-m) dx - F (12)
becomes an important feature of this model. U(P) n(x,P)
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Net Club Size 1
Benefit
Club Size 2
Club Size 3
0
i
1
1-P 1 11 Individual
0 U(P) U(2) U(1) U Valuation
Figure 1.
where U(P) < P is the lowest valuation level for where the marginal revenue on the right hand side
which a club of any size yields a positive net is comprised of two terms: additional revenue from
benefit. A necessary condition for maximizing sales generated by lowering the price and revenue
equation (12), assuming an internal solution, is lost on previous sales due to the price reduction.
The interesting new feature of equation (13a) is the
(13) way in which the quantity sold responds to a
change in price. First there are sales to clubs of
d,r f g(X) g(U(P)) size n,
dx-(P-m) U'= 0
dP U(P)n(x,P) n(U(P),P) g(U(P))
n(U(P),P)
Like equation (3), equation (13) can be arranged in Second, there is the U' term indicating how the
the traditional "marginal cost equals marginal valuation level at which clubs form responds to a
revenue" form, change in price. Further manipulation of equation
(13) results in a profit maximizing price of
(13a)
r g(U(p)) 1
m L U'- U
n(U(P),P) 1 g(X)
dxr g(u(p  7 g(X) U(P*)n(x,P*)
P L iu -f dx P =m+ (14)
n(U(P),P) J U(P) n(x,P) [g(U(P*)) / n(U(P*),P*)] U'
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Notice that since clubs purchase the software The potential for a publisher to indirectly ap-
product, the lower limit of integration, U(P*), is propriate revenue by exploiting club-induced
the valuation at which clubs cease to form. As segmentation of the market is depicted in panel b).
was the case in equation (4), the profit maximizing The highest price shown on the vertical axis, Pl, is
price is the marginal cost plus a margin comprised the price charged by the publisher. At this price,
of the ratio of total sales to marginal sales. Qi originals are sold to individual users. Assuming
the copies are made at a zero cost (c=0), (Q,-
II. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL Qi)/2 originals are sold at a price of Pi to clubs of
size two. The effective price paid by the Q - Qi
There are two interesting features of the situation club members is thus PI = Pl/2. Similarly, the
in which a publisher sells a software product in an effective price to members of clubs of size three is
environment where software clubs exist. The first Ps = Pi/3 with Q3 - Q: users. Thus the pub-
is that, although software clubs exist to make lisher's profit is represented by the sum of the
unauthorized copies of the software, they also areas of the stair-stepped shaded rectangles in
generate sales, sales which might not have occurred panel b).
if copying were effectively prevented. The second
feature is the sorting or "self-selection" of software The kernel of this paper is that the shaded area in
users into clubs of different sizes according to their panel b) may exceed the shaded area in panel a).
valuations of the product. Such segmentation of a With software clubs. the possibility exists for the
market can generally be used by the seller to publisher to gain the increased revenue associated
increase revenues through price discrimination. In with effective price discrimination. Further,
this case, the segmentation provides a mechanism software users implement the price discrimination by
through which the publisher can indirectly self-selecting themselves into clubs of various sizes.
appropriate revenue from the unauthorized copies.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Figure 2 illustrates the relevant alternatives. Panel
a) depicts the situation with no unauthorized Numerical examples will illustrate the phenomenon
copying. The publisher's downward sloping demand of unauthorized copying allowing the publisher to
curve is given by D. The maximum profit resulting increase profits. The attraction of these examples
from the equation of marginal costs (MC) and is that they emphasize the two major factors in the
marginal revenues (MR) is represented by the above model: the publisher's pricing decision and
shaded area. The software is sold at a price of P the effect of "quality" deterioration of unauthorized
and the quantity sold is Q. copies.
a b
Price Price
p 1 13-0.00,
P -
P2 &2--''- '
MC
AMR i#D ' #\D
1
0 Quantity Q Q Q Quantity1 23
Figure 2.
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Values for the model's "parameters" are required for The second distribution is triangular with
these examples. The publisher's fixed cost, F, does
not affect the pricing decision or the quantity sold;
it affects only profits. A value of 500 is used for
g(x) - <4 0- .0 4 x, 50< X=51%0}F. The publisher's marginal costs consist of
reproducing the program disks, printing the
documentation, distributing the product, and With this distribution, the easy correspondence
providing some user support. The marginal cost between valuation and quantity sold is lost.
parameter, m, is set to 10 as a reference value. However, a symmetric, unimodal distribution may
Club copying costs are assumed to be given by more accurately reflect "real world" valuations.
c(n,P) =c+ P/n, where three different values of c, When unauthorized copies cannot be made, these
the cost of an unauthorized copy, are used to parameter values are sufficient for determining the
illustrate the effect of copying costs on the extent publisher's price, quantity sold, and profits. For
of copying and the publisher's revenue. For the uniform distribution, solution of equation (4)
reference, Table 1 contains the values of these yields a profit maximizing price of 55, quantity sold
"parameters." To be concrete, these values may be of 45 units, and total revenue of 2475, resulting in
considered as dollar amounts. profits of 1525. For the triangular distribution,
solution of equation (4) yields a profit maximizing
The density function, g(.), sets both the size of the price of 44.29, quantity sold of 61 units, and total
market and the distribution of individual valuations revenue of 2702, resulting in profits of 1583.
within the market. For convenience, the size of
the market is set to 100. Since the distribution of In order to determine the outcome when it is
valuations within the market affects the publisher's possible to make unauthorized copies, values of 6(n)
pricing decision and unauthorized copying, two must be established. The first set of values for
market distributions are considered. The first is a 6(n) was chosen to illustrate a situation where
uniform distribution with copying initially has little impact on the quality of
the software product. Given the 6(n) values in
g(x)-1, O s x s 100. Table 2, no one would purchase an original and the
majority of sales would go to clubs of size two. If
c=0, the publisher's profits are maximized by
Specifying a uniform distribution for g(.) on the charging a price of 100 rather than the no-copying
interval [0,100] provides easy translation between price of 55. In this case, copying has clearly
valuation levels and the quantity sold. For example, reduced sales (23.64 units rather than 45), but
if individuals with valuations in excess of 75 profits have increased from 1525 to 1627.60. When
purchase the product, then 100 - 75 or 25 units c= 1 or c=2, unauthorized copying is reduced, yet
would be sold. profits remain above their no-copying level.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Parameter Value Meaning
F 500 Publisher Fixed Cost
m 10 Publisher Variable Cost
c 0,1,2 Cost of Unauthorized Copy
(exclusive of purchasing
the original)
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Table 2. Uniform Distribution
C=0, P=100.00 C=1, P=99.00 C=2, P=98.00
Club
Size 6(n) Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 .95 22.22 2222.00 22.50 2227.50 22.78 2232.44
3 .65 1.42 142.00 .90 89.10 0.37 36.26
4 .40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Totals 23.64 2634.00 23.40 2316.60 23.15 2268.70
Profits 1627.60 1582.60 1537.20
The triangular distribution yields results comparable Tables 4 and 5 utilize a second set of values for
to those shown in Table 2. Table 3 uses the same 6(n). These values illustrate a situation where
values of 6(n) as Table 2. In Table 3 the majority copying greatly reduces the quality of the software
of sales are to clubs of size two. For all three product. Table 4 presents the publisher's maximum
values of c, the publisher's price is substantially profit under the different values for c assuming a
above the no-copying price of 44.29 and the uniform distribution. When copying has such an
resulting profits are greater than the no-copying adverse impact on product quality, sales to
profits of 1583. Thus the self-selective behavior of individuals are reduced only slightly from the 45
club members allows the publisher to effectively units which would have occurred if copying were
acquire revenue for unauthorized copies. not possible. Additional revenues are earned on
Table 3. Triangular Distribution
C=0, P=81.50 C=1, P=79.50 C=2, P=78.00
Club
Size 6(n> Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue
1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 .95 29.50 2404.25 30.49 2423.95 31.22 2435.16
3 .65 2.02 164.63 1.07 85.06 0.15 11.70
4 .40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Totals 31.52 2568.88 31.56 2509.01 31.37 2446.86
Profits 1753.75 1693.40 1633.16
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Table 4. Uniform Distribution
C=0, P=58.00 C=1, P=57.50 C=2, P=57.50
Club
Size 6(n) Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue
1 1.00 42.00 2436.00 42.50 2443.75 42.50 2443.75
2 .50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 .40 3.22 186.76 2.36 135.70 1.53 87.97
4 .20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Totals 45.22 2622.89 44.68 2579.45 44.03 2531.72
Profits 1670.56 1630.85 1591.42
club sales so that, in every instance, the publisher's IV. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
profit exceeds the no-copying level of 1525. Table
5 displays similar results for the triangular A number of the assumptions employed in developing
distribution. Thus increased publisher profits can the model presented above are potentially testable
be obtained for a variety of values of 6(n), as are the model's implications. That the quality of
underlying distributions, and copying costs when software declines when unauthorized copies are
copying is possible. made is testable. Further, the amount of quality
Table 5. Triangular Distribution
C=0, P=47.00 C=1, P=46.00 C=2, P=45.50
Club
Size 6(n) Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue Q-Sold Revenue
1 1.00 55.82 2623.54 57.68 2653.28 58.60 2666.30
2 .50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 .40 4.50 211.50 2.99 137.54 1.52 69.16
4 .20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Totals 60.32 2835.04 60.67 2790.82 60.12 2735.46
Profits 1731.84 1684.12 1634.26
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deterioration may depend upon characteristics of the removed its hardware lock and raised its price
software product. For example, an unauthorized approximately 30 percent.
copy of a product which is menu-driven with
extensive on-line "Help" facilities may suffer little A final testable implication of the model is that
quality decline. Alternatively, an unauthorized copy software publishers' profits may be increased by
of a product which is command-driven with a copying. The use of multivariate techniques may
complex set-up procedure employing specialized detect a positive correlation between profits and
device drivers may suffer considerable quality the extent to which the software has been copied,
decline. taking suitable covariates into account. The
availability of third-party documentation and
A second testable implication concerns club sizes. instruction manuals could serve as a proxy for the
In the model, software club sizes were self-limiting. unobserved copying activity.
Although members of software clubs may be
reluctant to provide information on their activities V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
for fear of prosecution, specialized survey research
techniques may be able to elicit appropriate data. The model and the numerical examples suggest that
The key empirical issue is that the clubs be small. unauthorized copying of microcomputer software
does not necessarily impact adversely upon the
In the numerical examples, publishers were able to revenue or profits of software publishers. By
indirectly appropriate revenue from unauthorized adjusting prices to reflect unauthorized copying by
copies by increasing the price of the original. users, it may actually be possible for publishers to
Comparison of "copy protected" and "unprotected" achieve higher profits.
software prices should confirm that prices increase
when copying is possible. On this point there is The arguments presented in this paper should
some anecdotal evidence. One interesting phenome- generate further investigation of the effects of
non has been the release of both "copy protected" unauthorized duplication of microcomputer software.
and "unprotected" versions of the same software The testable implications set forth in the previous
product. In every instance, the "unprotected" section are obvious candidates for further research.
version commands a substantial price premium. One In addition, several other topics are deserving of
popular word processor, for example, is available attention. Additional understanding of the nature,
with "copy protection" for $75 while the "un- causes, and consequences of quality deterioration is
protected" version sells for between $200 and $250. needed. Estimates of "real world" product valuation
Another example is provided by a memory-resident distributions, publisher marginal costs, and the costs
program available in "copy protected" and of unauthorized copying are required. Finally, it
"unprotected" versions. The publisher reports that would be desirable to develop a general characteri-
the more expensive "unprotected" version has zation of necessary conditions under which copying
outsold the "copy protected" version by a factor of increases publisher profits.
five to one (Carroll 1986. p. 37). While "copy
protection" schemes may detract from the product ENDNOTES
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